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ABSTRACT 
 Each year the Marine Corps recruits more than 30,000 enlistees. In an effort to 
obtain high-quality enlistees, over 40 percent of enlistees ship to bootcamp during the 
June, July, August, and September trimester. In this thesis, I analyze the Marine Corps’ 
accession plan and the relationship between a Marine’s accession trimester and time 
awaiting training, as well as their likelihood to re-enlist after their first term and the 
probability of attrition prior to completing their first term. Additionally, this study 
determines if enlistees from the June, July, August, and September trimester outperform 
enlistees from the other trimesters. I use linear regression models and graphical trend 
analysis to estimate the relationships. 
 I find that June, July, August, and September enlistees have the highest mean days 
awaiting training. Furthermore, the phasing approach increases the time awaiting training 
days for the following trimester. The increase in time awaiting training appears to be 
negatively associated with the probability of re-enlistment. Graphical analysis suggests 
the June, July, August, and September enlistees did not perform better than their 
counterparts; however, the differences in performance measure are minor. The attrition 
model shows a modest negative correlation between time awaiting training and likelihood 
of attrition. Considering high-quality enlistees accumulate the most days, the estimated 
effect is logical. 
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The Marine Corps has distinguished itself throughout history every time America 
was thrust into war. The individual Marine is the center of gravity for such 
accomplishments. As the Commandant’s Planning Guidance (2019) states: 
Everything starts and ends with the individual Marine. The principal 
challenge facing the Marine Corps today lies in continuing to fulfill its 
charter as the naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, while simultaneously 
modernizing the force in accordance with the NDS, doing both with a leaner 
force structure, potentially fewer Marines, and a possible reduction in total 
resources. Marines are the centerpiece of the Corps—our principal 
emphasis must focus on recruiting; educating and training; instilling our 
core values and sense of accountability; equipping; and treating them with 
dignity, care, and concern. 
As with other large organizations, both civilian and federal, the Marine Corps’ 
success relies heavily upon the recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel. 
General David Berger, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, asserted in his planning 
guidance, “the Service does not have the tools needed to recruit the skills it wants, retain 
specific talents, advance Marines more quickly based on need, and separate Marines who 
cannot perform” (p. 7). A significant number of studies focus on the recruitment and 
retention of high-quality personnel. As such, the Marine Corps spends a vast amount on 
recruiting, transforming civilians into Marines, and on retaining top performers. Equally as 
important as recruiting and retaining key personnel is developing a process that does not 
hinder the desired effects. However, very little has been done to determine if transitioning 
civilians into Marines affects personnel retention. Although there are two tracks for 
entering the Marine Corps, officer and enlisted, the most impactful, based on sheer 
numbers, is the Enlisted Entry-Level Training (EELT). Therefore, the remaining focus of 
my thesis is on the EELT pipeline. 
The EELT pipeline begins with the accession plan and ends with an enlistee 
attaining a military occupational specialty (MOS). To understand the procedure, a brief 
description of the process is necessary. The accession provides inputs, via enlistees, into 
the EELT pipeline. Within this pipeline, multiple training nodes exist to provide adequate 
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and proper instruction to an enlistee. Once an enlistee cycles through the EELT pipeline, 
ideally, the cycle consists of one iteration at each node, that enlistee becomes a contributing 
Marine in the operational forces upon attaining a valid MOS. However, this description 
overtly simplifies the complex process of transforming a civilian into a Marine. If the 
overall goal is to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, given the impact and complexity 
of the EELT pipeline, a firm understanding of the process’s effects, both intentional and 
unintentional, warrants examination.  
A. PURPOSE 
My study’s purpose is to evaluate if the enlisted accession plan process increases 
time awaiting training (TAT), for enlistees in the EELT pipeline, and to determine if this 
increase influences retention. For the purpose of my research, TAT is defined by stagnated 
days an enlistee accumulates in between training environments related to capacity 
restrictions and training inefficiencies at each node. As such, a qualifying observation must 
have graduated recruit training. Time accumulated prior to accession falls under the 
Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and is outside this research’s focus. My research does not 
recommend structural changes in the EELT pipeline; instead, the purpose is to provide 
analytical information to the decision-makers to implement changes that maximize 
efficiency and effectiveness in the EELT pipeline. 
Observing individual enlistees from various accession periods within multiple 
years provides information on the accumulation of TAT. With this information, I use the 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) regression technique to analyze the effects on retention. 
The primary research question seeks to determine to what degree an enlistee’s accession 
period affect the accrual of TAT and whether or not this accrual of TAT impact retention. 
The Marine Corps’ ultimate goal is to recruit and retain high-quality personnel. 
Additionally, my study investigates these follow-on questions.  
 To what extent do enlistees that attend the most populated accession 
period perform at a greater level relative to other accession periods?   
 In what manner does an increase in TAT affect attrition? 
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Due to the complex nature of the EELT pipeline and the mandatory transition 
between multiple nodes, the JJAS accession period causes a compounding effect that 
increases TAT for JJAS and ONDJ enlistees. The increase in TAT reduces the probability 
of retaining a high-quality enlistee from these accession periods. Therefore, the EELT 
structure has an adverse effect on the ultimate goal of retaining high-quality personnel.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
Recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel are vital to the Marine Corps’ 
continued success and growth. Forming a structural process that is efficient and effective 
at transforming civilians into Marines is the standard to attain. The current Marine Corps 
process may not meet these requirements. The Commandant recognizes the importance of 
evaluating the current process. In the planning guidance, the Commandant declares, “our 
manpower system was designed in the industrial era to produce mass, not quality” (Berger, 
2019, p. 7). Determining if our manpower system does not contribute to quality recruitment 
and retention is crucial. 
The need to evaluate the process aside, the Marine Corps needs to cope with a 
reduction in personnel. The scrutiny of Department of Defense (DOD) budget requests 
places fiscal and personnel constraints on the Marine Corps. The fiscal year 2021 budget 
request reveals a reduction of active component personnel by 2,100 Marines (Secretary of 
the Navy, 2020). An inadequate process coupled with the continued reduction in force 
exacerbates the recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel. Through the 
Commandant’s guidance, the Marine Corps must ensure the EELT process does not work 
against the overarching mission, and an analysis of the process must be done.  
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I introduce that recruitment and retention have the same mission. 
The mission is to increase the number of high-quality personnel in the Marine Corps. 
Equally important is determining if the structural process, the EELT pipeline, assists or 
hinders recruitment and retention goals. My thesis’s focus is to provide an analysis of the 
EELT pipeline and the effects it poses on retention. As budget and personnel continue to 
decline, the importance of an effective and efficient system becomes paramount.  
4 
The structure of the subsequent chapters rationally supports my thesis. Chapter II 
describes the circumstances that create the EELT framework. Chapter III discloses the 
academic literatures that relate to my thesis. Chapters IV and V present the data and method 
associated with my thesis. The final chapters deliver the results, analysis, and conclusion. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background on the Marine Corps EELT pipeline. I introduce 
the determinants of accession numbers and standards, accession framework, EELT 
structure, and identify areas of concern and a brief description of the impact of an 
inefficient EELT process on the Marine Corps. I conclude with a summarization of the 
chapter.  
A. QUANTITY AND QUALITY 
Congressional and DOD authority dictate the quantity and quality of personnel in 
the Marine Corps. Congressional authority mandates fiscal year end-strength 
(Congressional Research Service [CSR], 2020). The fiscal year’s accession goal depends 
on the difference of congressional mandate mission and the projected amount retained by 
the end of the fiscal year. The projected number is the difference between retained, retired, 
and separated personnel. To maintain a military with the highest standard of 
professionalism and continued future growth, the DOD mandates two specific quality 
requirements regarding Non-Prior Service (NPS) enlistees (CSR, 2020). First, 90 percent 
of all enlistees must have obtained a high school diploma. Enlistees with a high school 
diploma are Tier I enlistees (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2011). Second, at least 
60 percent of enlistees must have an Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score above 
average. An enlistee that meets both quality requirements is a high-quality candidate 
(Quester, 2010). The following tables are derived from the Defense Primer: Active Duty 
Enlisted Recruiting (2020) document. Table 1 depicts quantity standards, and Table 2 
represents quality standards for the identified fiscal years. These stringent requirements 
contribute to the structure of the recruitment plan. Even with congressional end-strength 
fluctuations and DOD mandates on an enlistee’s quality, Table 1 and 2 reveals the current 
accession plan and EELT process result in mission accomplishment on both fronts. 
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Table 1. Marine Corps Active Component NPS Accession 
Fiscal Year Goal Achieved Percent of Goal 
2017 31,994 32,059 100.2 
2018 31,556 31,556 100.0 
2019 31,767 31,777 100.0 
Table 2. Marine Corps Active Component NPS Quality Metrics 
Standard Benchmark FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 
High School 
Diploma 
90% 99.8% 99.8% 99.5% 
Above 
Average AFQT 
60% 71.6% 69.9% 69.4% 
 
The Marine Corps’ approach to the accession of quality and quantity enlistees is 
economic opportunity and efficiency. Specifically, the economic advantage is the desire to 
recruit high-quality applicants to avoid the opportunity cost of losing an applicant to the 
alternatives, i.e., further schooling or other job opportunities (Quester, p. 26). New Oxford 
American Dictionary (2015) defines opportunity cost as “the loss of potential gain from 
other alternatives when one particular alternative is chosen over the others.”  Under these 
conditions, recruiting high-quality individuals upon availability is beneficial. 
B. ACCESSION PLAN 
The Marine Corps historically averages over 30,000 active component enlisted 
accessions per year (Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], 2018). Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command (MCRC) is primarily responsible for obtaining the number of enlistees to meet 
this accession goal determined by Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA). With each 
fiscal year requirement, MCRC distributes the accession goal throughout the year into four-
7 
month increments, appropriately named trimesters. These trimesters break down as 
follows: (1) October, November, December, and January (ONDJ); (2) February, March, 
April, and May (FMAM); and (3) June, July, August, and September (JJAS). The 30,000 
enlistees are distributed unevenly through the accession trimesters. 
To have an economic advantage, MCRC’s accession distribution aligns with high 
school graduation. Sourced from Quester (2010), Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the trimester 
distribution by gender. Derived from the figures, JJAS accounts for approximately  
40 percent of all accessions. Of note, each fiscal year ends on September 30. Once mission 
end-strength is attained, the remaining enlistee contracts attend the follow-on accession 
periods beginning in October not to exceed congressional budget constraints. It is no 
surprise that the second most populated trimester is ONDJ, followed by the FMAM 
trimester. Although the female accession distribution is not as extreme as the male 
counterparts, the ordering remains accurate.  
 
Figure 1. Male Historical Accession. Source: Quester (2010). 
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Figure 2. Female Historical Accession. Source: Quester (2010). 
As might be expected, the accession framework mirrors a fiscal year construct. The 
year is divided into manageable trimesters that allow adaptability to unexpected personnel 
changes and flexibility in the fiscal environment. The large difference in distribution, 
particularly JJAS distribution, relates to the rigorous enlistee standards placed on the 
Marine Corps and the economic advantage of recruiting enlistees immediately after high 
school graduation. Aligning recruitment efforts with the immediate availability of eligible 
high-quality candidates is the primary reason for increased accession numbers during the 
summer months. 
C. ENLISTED ENTRY-LEVEL TRAINING 
The EELT process consists of multiple nodes of training requirements. This section 
of the chapter describes each node an enlistee must process through. Figure 3 is the 
illustrative representation of the EELT process. 
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Figure 3. EELT Pipeline Flow Diagram 
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1. Recruit Training 
There are two geographical locations for recruit training: Parris Island, South 
Carolina, and San Diego, California. All enlistees, regardless of potential MOS, must 
attend recruit training. At the time of this study, integration of female enlistees into male 
recruit training has started. For this study, the integration does not change the overall 
process of EELT. The objective of recruit training is to “produce basically trained Marines 
who have embraced our core values and legacy” (USMC, n.d.-b). Recruit training is a 13-
week evolution that provides instruction on necessary rifleman skills, Marine Corps 
history, and intense physical training. Upon graduation, enlistees earn the title of Marine. 
2. Boot Leave 
Boot leave is considered any leave days granted to a Marine upon graduation from 
recruit training (USMC, 2020). Marines typically take 10 days of leave. There are options 
to extend days away from training under the Command Recruiter Duty. 
3. Command Recruiting Program 
The Marine Corps has the means to employ these newly minted Marines in a 
manner beneficial for recruiting. Command Recruiting Program (CDR) allows for the 
assignment of Marines to permissive temporary PTAD, at no cost to the government, for a 
period of up to 30 days to a RS or recruiting substation (RSS) nearest their hometown to 
assist in the recruiting effort (USMC, 2020). Typical participation in CDR occurs after 
graduation from recruit training or before instruction at a Formal Learning Center (FLC). 
Although the term Permissive Recruiter Assistant Program (PRASP) is commonly 
associated with such duty, MCO 1130.62C states PRASP is officially authorized for 
Marines that graduate recruit training and are on boot leave but prior to reporting to the 
School of Infantry (USMC, p. 1-1). For this study, the terms are interchangeable. The 
programs are a tool to employ Marines with schedules that do not align with FLC or School 
of Infantry.  
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4. School of Infantry 
All Marines assigned the 03XX MOS at recruit training are sent to SOI for formal 
instruction. There are two geographical locations for such instruction: Camp Pendleton, 
California, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. As with recruit training, formal instruction 
is mirrored at each location and does not affect my thesis context. Although there are 
multiple specialties within the 03XX MOS that require secondary schooling, my thesis is 
solely concerned with the first official course at an FLC. Upon completing the SOI 
instruction, Marines are awarded the respective 03XX MOS and become operational 
contributors upon arrival at their first duty station.  
5. Marine Combat Training 
Marines that are not in the 03XX MOS, non-infantry track, attend Marine Combat 
Training (MCT). The MCTs are under the SOI hierarchy. Therefore, the MCTs are 
geographically co-located with the SOIs. The MCT instruction provides Marines with a 
foundational understanding of the Marine Rifleman. The training evolution takes 29 days 
(USMC, n.d.-a). After graduating from the course, Marines are sent to their respective FLC 
to start instruction on their official MOS. 
6. Formal Learning Center 
Marines in the non-infantry track can be shipped to a vast range of over 100 
different school locations. These schools produce over 160 enlisted primary MOSs. Further 
confounding the matter, parts of the network are run by other services. Alfonso, Younger, 
and Oh (2010) discovered that “within that network of over 100 school locations, 37 are 
operated by the Navy, 26 by the Army, 21 by the Marine Corps, and 18 by the Air Force” 
(p. 33). Marines may have to attend subsequent courses to obtain a primary MOS, but that 
is outside the scope of my thesis. Completing the course at an FLC generates Marines with 
a primary MOS. These Marines become operational contributors once they arrive at their 
first duty station.  
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7. Time Awaiting Training 
There are three specific areas where a Marine can accumulate TAT and not be an 
active contributor to mission success. The first area is 03XX Marines in the infantry MOS 
queue waiting to be absorbed into an official SOI training course. Second are the non-
infantry Marines in the MCT queue. Lastly, are the graduates of MCT waiting in the FLC 
queue to start the official course. Some FLC’s may have brief administrative wait periods. 
My thesis defines TAT as when a Marine arrives at an MCT or FLC but cannot officially 
start a course due to seating or scheduling constraints.  
D. ACCESSION PLAN AND EELT IMPACT 
The accession load plan is a critical contributor to the Marine Corps operational 
environment. As of the fiscal year 2020, accessions accounted for over 16 percent of the 
186,200 total end-strength numbers in the active component (Cancian, 2020). Immediately 
upon accession, these enlistees become a part of the patients, prisoners, trainees, and 
transients (P2T2) designator. As the P2T2 naming convention suggests, these 30,000 
trainees remain in this status until they fill an assignable billet. While in the P2T2 status, 
the enlistees count against end-strength but do not contribute to the operational 
environment.  
Inefficiencies in the process accumulate shortfalls of valued contract enlistment 
time. For example, an enlistee signs a four-year contract, and from accession, it takes one 
year to the fleet. The Marine Corps gains three years of value for the cost of one year of 
unavailability due to training. Any reduction in TAT by increasing efficiencies is going to 
increase value while reducing training costs. Opportunities exist to increase the return on 
investment the enlistees provide. 
In addition to fiscal and personnel quantity impacts, the accession plan incurs a cost 
that the staff of the EELT pipeline absorbs. First, additional staff support is required to 
maintain and train the influx of enlistees. Second, the influx puts additional stress on the 
instructors and support staff to provide the same quality of training regardless of size. 
Lastly, the accession plan increases enlistee attrition from the inability to train over 
capacity numbers properly. 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduces the congressional and DOD regulations that set the 
standards for enlistees’ quantity and quality. The responsible agency, M&RA, and 
executing agency, MCRC, work in conjunction to obtain the number of enlistees to meet 
end-strength. They accomplish the mission by creating trimesters to manage enlistee flow. 
Once an enlistee accessions, the enlistee is entered into a complex network known as the 
EELT pipeline. Given the complexity, inefficiencies occur by way of TAT. The accession 
plan and EELT pipeline’s impact goes beyond input and MOS producing numbers. The 
plan reduces the available operational force numbers, increases the fiscal cost of producing 
Marines, and places additional stressors on the EELT pipeline staff. Understanding the 
effects of the current accession plan can allow decision-makers to make informative 
decisions to increase the operational force’s lethality.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Copious amounts of research have been conducted to assist the Marine Corps in 
determining performance and attrition predictors. Equally abundant has been the research 
completed on EELT. The specific focus of EELT research is to reduce TAT. In this chapter, 
I review the related academic literature to describe the body of research conducted and 
distinguish those studies from the research conducted in this thesis.  
A. PERFORMANCE AND ATTRITION 
This section concentrates on research accomplished concerning performance and 
attrition. The two studies in this section take different approaches. Quester aims to find 
predictors of success, while Larger validates the measure of performance the Marine Corps 
currently utilizes to predict future performance. The details of each study and the relation 
to this thesis proceed in the follow-on paragraphs.  
1. Quester (2010) 
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study done by Quester most closely 
represents this thesis. Quester uses a logistic regression model to analyze the marginal 
effect of accession characteristic predictors on Bootcamp attrition. The study reaffirms the 
status quo, in which enlistees with higher AFQT scores, better education, meet height and 
weight standards, and enlist without waivers have lower attrition rates. Other interesting 
predictors the study associated with lower Bootcamp attrition are DEP participation for 
three or more months, longer initial contracts, and JJAS accessions. These predictors are 
not typical and, therefore, require further discussion is required. 
DEP is a component of the Marine Corps Reserve (USMC, 2011). The program is 
eligible for NPS individuals intending to enlist into the active component. DEP is primarily 
associated with preparing individuals for the physical and mental demands associated with 
Bootcamp. The program also provides foundational physical instruction and fundamental 
Marine Corps knowledge. It is of no surprise that DEP participation and preparation yields 
a greater probability of Bootcamp success. 
16 
As with DEP, a further examination into longer contracts as a predictor of success 
needs to be done. Quester believes that enlistees who sign longer contracts have a more 
robust “taste” for service to the country. I expect enlistees with longer contracts are entering 
into a more technical MOS, which is translatable in the civilian sector. The increased desire 
to serve and achieve a translatable MOS provides the motivation enlistees use to succeed 
at Bootcamp.  
Quester also determines enlistees that accession in the JJAS trimester have lower 
attrition rates. The results of the study state across all levels of enlistees, the attrition rate 
is lower in the JJAS period. The reasoning provided is the fostered environment in JJAS 
increases success. The environment combined with a more significant percentage of high-
quality enlistees raises the level of expectation and performance. 
Quester’s CNA research goes a step further and provides analysis on the entire first 
term of enlistees. The research aims to answer the question higher Bootcamp attrition 
reduces overall first-term attrition. The study exposes that attrition Bootcamp attrition, on 
the margin, cannot reduce or recognize those that would later attrite in the first term for 
males but maybe a valid predictor for females.  
Equally as impressive is the analysis that enlistees who accession in JJAS have a 
lower probability of attrition in the first term. The logistic regression states males from the 
JJAS have a 1.6 percentage point reduction from attrition in the first term. The results for 
females are they have a 2.3 percentage point reduction from attrition in the first term. My 
thesis builds upon this study and uses a different method for analysis. 
2. Larger (2017) 
Larger’s Naval Postgraduate School thesis, appropriately titled Effectiveness of the 
Marine Corps’ Junior Enlisted Performance Evaluation System: An Evaluation of 
Proficiency and Conduct Marks, uses multivariate regression and factor analysis to assess 
if the current Marine Corps’ system is an adequate measure of job performance and future 
ability. Explicitly, Larger examines the reliability, validity, accuracy, and practicality of 
proficiency and conduct (PRO/CON) marks.  
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In terms of reliability, Larger determines PRO/CON marks appear to be stable, 
although there are some inconsistencies with individual raters. The study confirms that 
PRO/CON marks are a valid measure of future performance. Furthermore, according to 
this study, PRO/CON marks are the strongest predictors of future performance. PRO/CON 
marks are accurate due to formal guidance provided by Marine Corps Order P1070.12; 
however, marks are inflated within the assigned ranges. Lastly, PRO/CON marks are 
practical because raters can observe the marks’ traits even though they may be difficult 
with raters interpreting previous marks. Larger deems, although there is room for 
improvement, proficiency and conduct marks achieve their intended purpose.   
Larger’s analysis of the PRO/CON marks affirms they are the best predictors of 
future performance. My thesis applies this analysis of performance measures to enlistees 
in each trimester to determine if, in fact, those enlistees that accession in JJAS outperforms 
the other trimesters. The analysis additionally asserts if high-quality enlistees perform 
relatively better than those that are not. 
B. ENLISTED ENTRY-LEVEL TRAINING 
This section concentrates on research completed on EELT. I review four theses that 
focus on reducing TAT through operation management techniques. Two of the studies 
produce linear models to generate a scheduler built by the constraints of FLCs. The other 
two studies analyze the FLCs to determine utilization rates to make recommendations for 
improvement. Each of the research determines a link from the accession plan to 
inefficiencies in the EELT pipeline. The details of each study and the relation to this thesis 
proceed in the follow-on paragraphs. 
1. Whaley (2001) 
Whaley analyzes the development phase of the EELT pipeline and integrates his 
study with FLC data for non-infantry enlistees. Ultimately, Whaley produces two linear 
programming models as a tool for M&RA planners and schoolhouse coordinators to 
integrate into the planning system to reduce TAT for non-infantry enlistees. The long-term 
model is for the planning phase two years out from execution. This model aims to reduce 
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the TAT between MCT and FLC. The model builds an initial demand matrix of enlistees 
by week, gender, and enlistment program. Whaley’s short-term model updates the program 
plan one year before execution. The model updates FLC data, availability of training seats 
and builds a final demand matrix of enlistees by week, gender, and enlistment program. 
Both models place heavy penalties on FLC seating constraints. The matrix becomes a 
scheduler for MCRC and decides accession flow according to available FLC seats and 
MOS demand. 
From a qualitative perspective, Whaley recommends three changes to reduce TAT. 
First, at the guidance of Training and Education Command via M&RA to MCRC, there 
should be a link to the accession plan from the FLC school seat capacity and schedule. 
Second, MCRC would generate a weekly MOS training request, creating increased 
flexibility in real-time, to allow for variability at the FLCs. Third, Whaley suggests giving 
more control to the FLC while in the accession plan’s execution phase. Whaley’s 
qualitative approach reflects the quantitative analysis, wherein the penalties for 
accessioning an enlistee while there are no FLC seats available violates the model.  
Whaley’s operation management approach finds inefficiencies in the production 
process and limits enlistee input to match the constraints. The model concentrates on 
decreasing fiscal cost and lost operational time by reducing TAT through accession 
smoothing based on FLC constraints. My thesis differs by not trying to smooth the 
accession plan but determine if the effects reach beyond fiscal and operational costs. 
2. Detar (2004) 
Much like Whaley’s study, Detar’s research generates a linear optimization model, 
Entry-Level Course Scheduler (ELCS), to reduce TAT. Detar’s study differs by 
emphasizing fewer penalties caused by FLC constraints and working within the accession 
plan to minimize TAT and not eliminate TAT completely. Detar’s model specifically 
concentrates on TAT generated by enlistees transitioning from MCT to an FLC. The model 
produces a consistent number of Marines awaiting training (MAT) across the fiscal year 
by accepting TAT. By having a consistent value, Detar assumes planners and coordinators 
can find useful employment of those transitioning Marines, albeit not in the operational 
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forces, but an administrative support role such as community relations or base 
beautification.  
Detar identifies areas of improving TAT while working with the economics of the 
accession plan. The model created by Detar’s study is a better fit for realistic operations 
because the non-absolutes provide flexibility. Detar’s model reduces TAT by over 40 
percent and intends to generate a more coordinated effort between planners and 
implementors of the accession plan. Detar offers a consistent number of MAT throughout 
the fiscal year, contributing to a supporting role. Even with the use of ELCS, my thesis 
determines if the accession plan, through TAT and regardless of reduction, has unintended 
effects on retention and attrition.  
3. Alfonso, Younger, and Oh (2010) 
Alfonso et al. conduct synchronize approach analysis of the EELT process from the 
planning phase to MOS attainment by using supply chain and operation management 
techniques. Both techniques seek to improve efficiency. Supply chain management, in their 
study, seeks to apply the supply chain process from beginning to end of the operations 
cycle. Operations management in their work seeks to analyze nodes within the process. 
Alfonso et al. suggest five improvements to the EELT pipeline process. First, they suggest 
smoothing out the accession plan by offering bonuses and more extended DEP 
participation. Second, they generate a “pull” system giving more control to the nodes with 
greater capacity. Third, they restructure the recruit training depots, MCTs, and FLCs during 
the ONDJ trimester. Explicitly, reducing recruit training capacity at the recruit depots while 
increasing capacity and courses at the MCTs and FLCs to alleviate cost with overutilization 
and inventory buildup. Fourth, they suggest establishing a supply chain owner to provide 
oversight and coordination among the owning agencies in the EELT process, focusing on 
reducing inventory and cost. Lastly, they recommend modifying Marine Corps Training 
Information Management System (MCTIMS) to realize the system’s full potential. 
MCTIMS can be the central tool to provide real-time information and coordination to 
decision-makers and implementors of the EELT pipeline. 
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The study of Alfonso et al. looks to implement supply chain and operations 
management into the EELT pipeline. As with another thesis in the section, the study’s sole 
focus is to reduce TAT’s fiscal and operational cost. The recommendation to smooth out 
the accession plan by sending more enlistees through the ONDJ trimester further reiterates 
the need for understanding the effects of bootcamp accession; my thesis makes an effort to 
provide this analysis. 
4. Ezell III (2011) 
A direct continuation of Alfonso et al. study, Ezell uses similar operation 
management tools and techniques to examine four FLCs within the EELT pipeline. Ezell 
examines the Personnel Administration School, Financial Management School, Motor 
Transport Instructor Company, and Marine Artillery Detachment, Fort Sill, for 
inefficiencies the accession plan puts on those four FLCs. Ezell recommends generating a 
pre-screening at the FLCs to maximize training opportunities and screen enlistees for the 
potential to rearrange seating priority. The study also recommends further utilization rate 
analysis be conducted as the variation of rates were relatively different amongst each other. 
As with Alfonso et al., Ezell recommends the development of MCTIMS to realize a unified 
system’s potential. The study takes it a step further and recommends integration with other 
services, as some FLCs fall under brother service authority. Ezell carefully states the 
accession plan is the subject of much discussion but falls outside the research scope, yet 
there are other areas in the EELT pipeline that can reduce TAT. My thesis intends to 
provide an analysis of the effects of the accession plan.  
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed six studies involving performance predictors, performance 
measures, and EELT pipeline analysis. Two of the studies analyze performance from 
different aspects. Quester’s analysis provides predictors of success in bootcamp. The 
Quester study reaffirms the characteristics associated with quality reduce bootcamp 
attrition. Distinctively, Quester’s report concludes DEP participation, longer initial 
contracts, and JJAS accession also reduce attrition at bootcamp. In comparison, Larger 
provides analysis on the performance measuring system the Marine Corps employs. His 
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research determines the current performance measuring system for junior enlisted Marines 
can be improved but is a valid mechanism at predicting future performance.  
The other four study the EELT pipeline. In Whaley’s and Detar’s examinations, 
they both create linear optimization programs that generate streamline scheduling. Their 
studies emphasize restraining the accession plan to the capacity constraints at the FLCs. 
The results from their studies reduce TAT and increase efficiency. Alfonso et al. integrate 
supply chain and operations management into the EELT pipeline to reduce TAT. The 
results of their study reduce the accession plan inputs to decrease the overhead cost 
associated with TAT. As for the last study, Ezell focuses on four FLCs to recommend 
improvements in each FLC to optimize production. His results are that TAT can be reduced 
with changes procedural changes at the FLC. All four attempt to reduce TAT generated by 
the accession plan. The next chapter presents the data used by this thesis. 
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IV. DATA 
Data for this research was drawn from the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW). 
The data was pooled from the Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support System 
(MCRISS), MCTIMS, and Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). Manpower 
information provided paneled and cross-sectional data for Marine Corps’ enlistees grouped 
by accession period and fiscal year. The succeeding paragraphs describe the merging 
process, independent variables, issues and remedies, and provide statistical summary for 
the data. 
A. MERGING OF DATA 
The original data was in panel data format from four data sets that consisted of 
2,133,349 observations and 58 variables. The data spans from fiscal year 2012 to 2014. 
The data was converted into longitudinal observations and merged using EDIPI. After 
conversion, duplicate observations were removed. Each observation contained two unique 
identifiers, EDIPI and a unique user identifier (UUID). After validating each EDIPI had a 
randomly generated UUID, the EDIPI variable was dropped to remove personal 
identifiable information from the data set. The match rate across all four data sets is 100 
percent of the observations. 
B. DATA SOURCES 
1. MCRISS 
MCRISS data consists of information on an enlistee prior to accession. The data 
includes information on demographics, aptitude, and physical measures. Table 3 lists the 




Table 3. Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support System Variables 
Variable Name Description 
EDIPI Electronic Data Interchange Personal Identifier matched with 
TFDW data 
Gender Indicator for male or female, as reported by enlistee 
Race As reported by enlistee 
Ethnicity As reported by enlistee 
AFQT Score Armed Forces Qualification Test result 
Education Highest level of education completed 
DOB Date of birth 
IST Crunches 2-minute crunch repetition score 
IST Hang Flex arm hang score (female measure) 
IST Run Score 1.5 mile run time 
IST Pull-up Score Pull-up repetition score (male measure) 
 
2. MCTIMS 
MCTIMS data provides date and FLC identifier data for achieved milestones in the 






Table 4. Marine Corps Training Information Management System Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Bootcamp Start Date Date an enlistee started bootcamp 
Bootcamp Grad Date Date an enlistee graduated from bootcamp 
MCT Report Date Date enlistee arrived at MCT 
MCT Convene Date Official training start date at MCT 
MCT Completion Date Date enlistee graduated from MCT 
School Code Three digit formal FLC identifier 
School FLC name 
Report Date Date the enlistee arrived at FLC 
Convene Date Official class start date at FLC 
Completion Date Date enlistee graduated from FLC 
 
3. MCTFS 
MCTFS continuously records, processes, and maintains personnel and pay data for 
all active, reserve, and retired personnel. MCTFS provides dates and snapshot data from 







Table 5. Marine Corps Total Force System Variables 
Variable Name Description 
AFADBD Armed Forces Active Duty Base Date - the date an 
enlistee officially started active duty 
PMOS Primary MOS an enlistee was assigned 
Grade Rank at the time of snapshot 
Proficiency Average Grade Average proficiency score of a specific rank for an 
enlistee throughout their term 
Conduct Average Grade Average conduct score of a specific rank for an enlistee 
throughout their term 
Separation Code Three digit separation identifier  
Separation Narrative Description of separation code 
Separation Date Date an enlistee separated from the Marine Corps 
EAS End of Active Service date an enlistee leaves active 
duty 
Date of Enlistment Date an enlistee enlists in the Marine Corps 
 
C. GENERATED VARIABLES 
Generated variables are extrapolated from the data to isolate the necessary 




Table 6. Generated Variables 
Variable Name Variable Description 
Age Age of enlinstee at bootcamp start date 
High-Quality Binary variable identifying an enlistee that is tier I and has a 
AFQT score above 50 
JJAS Binary identifier for an enlistee that accession in the months of 
June, July, August, and September 
ONDJ Binary identifier for an enlistee that accession in the months of 
October, November, December, and January 
FMAM Binary identifier for an enlistee that accession in the months of 
February, March, April, and May 
FY12 Binary identifier for fiscal year period of 2012 
FY13 Binary identifier for fiscal year period of 2013 
FY14 Binary identifier for fiscal year period of 2014 
Combat MOS Binary identifier for enlistees with a 03XX, 08XX, or 18XX 
MOS 
Aviation MOS Binary identifier for enlistees with a MOS between 6000 to 7315 
General MOS Binary identifier for enlistees with a MOS between 8000 to 9900 
Ground Support 
MOS 
Binary identifier for enlistees with all other MOS not previously 
listed 
High School Grad Binary for traditional high school as the highest completed 
education level 
College Binary for some college experience as the highest level 
completed 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
Other Educ Binary for education that does not fit in the other education 
variables 
Bootcamp Attrite Binary identifier for enlistees that attrite at bootcamp 
Attrite Binary identifier for an enlistee that separates after bootcamp but 
before EAS 
FLC Wait Time Measurement, in days, of time between MCT graduation and 
FLC convene date an enlistee waits to start FLC training 
Retain Binary identifier for an enlistee that re-enlisted or extended 
service past their first-term 
 
D. ISSUES AND REMEDIES 
1. Panel Data 
The original data set was in panel format that contained multiple snapshot data for 
each observation’s average PRO/CON in grade marks. As the average PRO/CON in grade 
marks is an aggregate mean for each mark received in grade, the data was converted into 
cross-sectional data that kept the observation’s last mark received for that grade. By 
transitioning to cross-sectional data, I was able to generate independent average PRO/CON 
in grade marks for each rank the observation attained.  
2. Retain 
The data set contained separation codes, narratives, and dates. If an observation did 
not contain values for the aforementioned variables, the assumption is the observation, as 
of the date of data collection, is still serving on active duty. For the purpose of my study, 
the retain variable indicates service that exceeds the first term. Due to the data timeframe, 
there is a possibility that an observation continued to serve one additional tour past the first 
term and obtained a separation code. For example, if an observation from fiscal year 2012 
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served for an additional three years after the first term and then left the service, the 
observation would have a separation code, date, and narrative. Yet, the observation would 
be considered retained by my study’s standard. To capture this information, an observation 
receives a retain value of one if their separation date exceeds their EAS date.  
3. TAT 
Due to limitations of the data set and time constraints, TAT is limited to FLC Wait 
Time variable response data. TAT days from bootcamp graduation to MCT/SOI start date 
could not be verified without official leave dates for each enlistee. For the remainder of my 
study, FLC Wait Time and TAT are interchangeable.  
Observations with greater than 120 days of TAT are not in the regression analysis. 
These observations were likely caused by administrative errors or circumstances not typical 
of the progression of an enlistee. To properly conduct structural analysis of the accession 
period’s effect on TAT, retention, and attrition, these observations are not considered in 
the regression models.  
4. Sample Restrictions and Missing Data 
If an observation had missing data points or unrealistic values, an imputation 
technique was applied. Imputation consists of aggregating the mean of the variable and 
inputting the mean as the missing value. Dummy variables were then created to identify 




Table 7. Imputed Variables 
Variable Name Description 
X IST Crunch Binary for missing/overvalued crunch score 
X IST Hang Binary for missing/overvalued flex arm hang score (females 
only) 
X IST Run Binary for missing/overvalued run score 
X IST Pull-up Binary for missing/overvalued pull-up score (males only) 
 
5. Omitted Observations 
Observations were omitted if an observation bootcamp start date or AFADBD did 
not occur in fiscal year 2012 to 2014. Other omitted observations were due to missing 
information that could not be cross referenced with other independent variables. After 
cleaning, 88,103 observations and 100 variables remain. 
E. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The data set includes 88,103 enlistee observations between fiscal year 2012 to 
2014. The statistical summary of non-binary variables in my study is outlined in Table 8. 
Table 9 presents the statistical summary for binary variables. Figures 4 to 10 provide 
distribution data across fiscal years to verify proportional contributions. The lists of MOSs 
and frequency distribution of each MOS in my study are presented in the appendix.  
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Table 8. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AFQT Score 88,103 61.767 18.326 0 99 
Age 88,103 19.677 1.814 17.081 42.867 
IST Crunches 78,325 84.636 20.563 0 241 
IST Hang 7,310 51.285 20.091 0 220 
IST Pull-up 71,125 12.248 5.779 0 215 
IST Run 78,270 11.218 1.708 0 95.133 
E1 Pro  48,755 42.077 1.955 1 50 
E1 Con 48,753 42.023 2.315 1 50 
E2 Pro 77,015 43.101 1.969 1 50 
E2 Con 77,013 42.887 2.116 1 50 
E3 Pro 77,874 43.606 1.619 10 50 
E3 Con 77,874 43.524 1.791 10 50 
E4 Pro 65,888 44.260 1.602 19 50 
E4 Con 65,888 44.234 1.694 10 50 




Table 9. Binary Variables Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Female 88,103 .092 .289 
Male 88,103 .908 .289 
High-Quality 88,103 .705 .456 
JJAS 88,103 .493 .500 
ONDJ 88,103 .274 .446 
FMAM 88,103 .233 .423 
Combat MOS 88,103 .253 .434 
Aviation MOS 88,103 .203 .402 
Ground Support 
MOS 
88,103 .530 .499 
General MOS 88,103 .014 .119 
Bootcamp Attrite 88,103 .050 .219 
Attrite 83,668 .131 .337 
Retain 72,670 .210 .408 
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Figure 4. Age Distribution by Fiscal Year 
34 
 
Figure 5. Gender Distribution by Fiscal Year 
 
Figure 6. High Quality Distribution by Fiscal Year 
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Figure 7. JJAS Distribution by Fiscal Year 
 
Figure 8. Time Awaiting Training Average Days by Fiscal Year 
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Figure 9. Attrition Distribution by Fiscal Year 
 
Figure 10. Retention Distribution by Fiscal Year 
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F. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduces the data for analysis. The chapter also introduces a 
description of the sources and a list of independent variables these sources provide. 
Additionally, I describe the merging and cleaning process I use on the data. Furthermore, 
I explain the issues with the data and provide remedies to alleviate problems the data may 
cause on the regressions. Lastly, the chapter produces summary statistics and distribution 
evidence that provides a foundation for the methodology in the next chapter. 
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V. METHODOLOGY 
I use STATA version 16.1 throughout my research. The techniques I use for 
analysis are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), LPM, and relative statistics. A detailed 
description of the techniques, models, and variables is presented in the succeeding 
paragraphs.  
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To answer my primary research question: to what degree does an enlistee’s 
accession period affect the accrual of TAT and whether or not this accrual of TAT impacts 
retention, I use two steps. First, I use OLS to determine if the accession trimester has a 
significant effect on TAT. Second, I use a LPM regression to analyze the effects of TAT 
and accession trimester on retention.  
1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAT AND ACCESSION 
I use the OLS regression method to provide analysis on the accession trimester 
effects on TAT. The dependent variable is continuous and the independent variables are 
dichotomous. I use the JJAS accession trimester as the reference variable. I validate the 
model through visual inspection of the residuals and use the Breusch-Pagen test for 
heteroskedasticity. The regression incorporates robust standard errors to correct for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. The following formula is the final model: 
 
 0 1 2 3 42012 2014FLCWaitTime ONDJ FMAM Fiscal Year FiscalYear            
 
2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RETENTION AND ACCESSION 
In the second step, I use a LPM regression to provide analysis on the impact of 
accession trimester and TAT on retention. The dependent variable reflects an enlistee re-
enlisting or extending past their first term of enlistment (Retain=1) or leaving the Marine 
Corps after completion of their first term of enlistment (Retain=0). Therefore, a qualifying 
observation is conditional on the observation completing their first term of enlistment. The 
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formula for a LPM differs from OLS as the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable. 
Arkes (2019) states that LPM has advantages over probits and logits in certain ways, 
including the simplicity of interpretation. In addition, Arkes (2019) argues that any 
problems with using LPM are minimal if the mean of the dependent variable is not near 
zero and the sample size is not too small, both of which are the case here. The final output 
includes three models. The initial model is a baseline model. I continue to add relevant 
independent variables to provide analysis on the overall effects. As with OLS, the 
regression includes robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. The following 
formula is the final model: 
 
 






P tain FLCWait Time JJAS FMAM
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Combat MOS
Aviation MOS General MOS
   
  
  





B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
To answer the secondary research question: to what extent do enlistees that attend 
the most populated accession period perform at a greater level relative to other accession 
periods, I use descriptive statistics to calculate the changes in PRO/CON average grade 
scores across accession periods. The isolation of accession periods on PRO/CON average 
grade reveals if there are any stark differences in scores amongst accession periods. I take 
it a step further and provide descriptive PRO/CON average grade scores for high-quality 
enlistees to determine if a high-quality enlistee performs relatively better than their 
counterparts. To conclude, I generate a comparison matrix that summarizes the changes. 
C. TERTIARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
To answer the tertiary research question: in what manner does an increase in TAT 
affect attrition, I use LPM regression to provide analysis on the impact of TAT on attrition. 
The binary dependent variable reflects an enlistee that fails to complete the first term of 
enlistment (Attrite=1) or successfully fulfills a first term enlistment (Attrite=0). The 
regression technique allows me to provide analysis on the probability an enlistee will attrite 
given an increase in TAT. The final output includes three independent models. The initial 
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model is the baseline model with TAT and accession trimester independent variables. I 
continue to add relevant independent variables to provide analysis on the overall effect. 
The regression includes robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. The 
following formula is the final model: 
 
 






P Attrite FLCWait Time JJAS FMAM
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Combat MOS
Aviation MOS General MOS
   
  
  






In this Chapter I review the methodology for each research question. I describe the 
three techniques I use for my study and explain the models while supplying the variables 
within these models. This section provides the basis for my analysis in the next chapter. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The chapter reports the results and interprets the findings from the regressions. As 
there are multiple models, the chapter is organized by research question to provide an 
organized approach to the regression analysis and results.  
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To determine the degree to which an enlistee’s accession period affects the accrual 
of TAT and whether or not this accrual of TAT impacts retention, I first isolate the effects 
of the accession trimester on TAT by conducting OLS regression. I use JJAS as the 
reference for accession trimester and fiscal year 2013 for the year. Table 10 displays the 
regression output from the model. As shown in Table 10, all values are statistically 
significant with ONDJ at α = 0.05 level and the remaining variables at the α = 0.001 level. 
On average, FMAM enlistees experience 4.3 fewer days of TAT compared to JJAS 
enlistees. As previous literature suggests, the JJAS accession trimesters appear to 
significantly affect the accrual TAT. JJAS enlistees accumulate more TAT, on average, 
than the other accession periods. Additionally, while accounting for the sheer number of 
accessions in the JJAS trimester, the total TAT days greatly exceed the other trimesters. 
Interestingly, ONDJ has the second highest average accumulation of TAT days. An 
explanation of the close averages is the surge in the JJAS trimester generates TAT and the 
issue compounds for the ONDJ enlistee resulting in similar number of TAT. Furthermore, 
enlistees from fiscal year 2012 and 2014, on average, spent fewer days awaiting training 
compared to fiscal year 2013. Figure 5, in the previous chapter, reveals fiscal year 2013 is 
the most populated fiscal year from the data set.  
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Table 10. Accession Effects on Time Awaiting Training 
Variable Coefficient Estimate Standard Error 
ONDJ -0.58* (0.26) 
FMAM -4.3*** (0.26) 
FY12 -6.0*** (0.25) 
FY14 -1.4*** (0.27) 
Constant 34*** (0.22) 
Observations 72,830 
Adjusted R-square 0.012 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Taking into account the statistically significant effect of the accession trimester on 
TAT, I determine if the accrual of TAT has an effect on retention. Using a LPM, I generate 
an initial model only controlling for TAT and accession trimester. I ensure the conditional 
observation standard is met and that the only observations in the model complete their first 
term. Subsequently, I include year and MOS controls to evaluate the differences on 
retention. Additional variables, including other trimesters, allow me to observe the 
estimated effect of TAT on retention. Without these controls, TAT would absorb the 
interactions of the controls and the result would be a biased estimate. Table 11 shows the 
results of the LPM regression output in which the binary dependent variable retention is an 
enlistee that continues to serve past their first term (Retain=1) or exits service after their 
first term (Retain=0). The initial model discloses all estimates are statistically significant 
at the α = 0.001 level. The model indicates TAT has a negative correlation with retention. 
Every 10 days of TAT is associated with a reduction in an enlistee’s probability of re-
enlistment of 0.7 percentage points. Considering the average TAT for the data set is 
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approximately 30 days, the average enlistee’s probability of re-enlistment is reduced by 
2.1 percentage points. To put the results into an accession trimester perspective, JJAS 
enlistees would only need to accumulate 16 days of TAT to nullify the positive correlation 
of re-enlistment associated with accession in JJAS. The result also indicates JJAS and 
FMAM enlistees, on average, are more likely to serve beyond their first term compared to 
ONDJ enlistees. An explanation is the enlistees from ONDJ experience a compounding of 
TAT generated from JJAS enlistees. There are fewer ONDJ enlistees, yet, on average, the 
ONDJ enlistees accrue the same number of TAT. This accumulation of TAT reduces the 
overall Marine Corps experience for ONDJ enlistees and creates an estimated effect on 
retention. 
In the final model, controlling for fiscal year and MOS type, all coefficient 
estimates remain statistically significant. The only difference in significance level is in the 
FMAM accession, which is reduced to the α = 0.01 level. The coefficient estimates slightly 
increase for JJAS by 0.03 percentage points and decreases for FMAM by 0.2 percentage 
points. It is imperative to note that an enlistee who amasses more than 17 days of TAT 
negates any positive correlation from their trimester, regardless of accession period. 
The final model provides other interesting results, such as the opposite correlating 
effects the fiscal years have. Both fiscal year estimates are statistically significant on the 
same level but affect retention in different manners. Further analysis reveals the economic 
environment may have contributed to this relationship. In the year 2016, the year most of 
the 2012 enlistees must make a re-enlistment decision, the United States economy was 
steadily growing. In an article by Dorfman (2016), he revealed the unemployment rate 
dropped to 4.6 percent, the lowest the rate has been in years and the rate was almost half 
of what it was in 2012. The anticipation that the economy would continue to grow 
influenced the decision made by the enlistees of cohort 2012. Unlike the enlistees of cohort 
2012, at the time of the 2014 cohort’s decision, the economy was steady but fell short of 
the desired Growth Domestic Product rate (Mutikani, 2019). The unemployment rate had 
marginally decreased and not to the same number experienced by the 2012 cohort (Plecher, 
2020). The 2014 cohort decided to exceed their original contract, considering the 
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economical alternative, and extend or re-enlist. These economic environmental factors 
contributed to the decision of the respective cohorts. 
The MOS group coefficient estimates have a statistically significant effect on 
retention as well. The MOS coefficients all have significance at the same α = 0.001 level. 
Re-enlistment is restricted to the availability of boatspace for every MOS. For example, if 
150 Marines from the 03XX MOS desire to re-enlist but there are only 100 boatspace 
available for the 03XX MOS, then 50 Marines could not re-enlist. The differences in the 
MOS coefficient estimates can possibly be explained by the limitations of boatspace for 
each MOS. 
To determine the overall estimated effect an accession period and TAT has on 
retention, I review the final model and discuss the relationship. TAT, as expected, is 
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of retention, whereas the JJAS is associated 
with an increase in the likelihood of retention. The data suggest the opposite influences 
from each of the estimates imply there is a point in which these actions cancel each other 
out. For example, if a JJAS enlistee accumulates 17 days of TAT the TAT effect would 
reduce the likelihood of retention by 1.7 percentage points. That value is the exact number 




Table 11. Time Awaiting Training Effects on Retention 
Variable Initial Adding Year Adding PMOS 
FLC Wait Time -0.00070*** -0.00076*** -0.00100*** 
 (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
JJAS 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
FMAM 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
FY12  -0.031*** -0.032*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
FY14  0.034*** 0.033*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Combat MOS   -0.065*** 
   (0.004) 
Aviation MOS   0.015*** 
   (0.005) 
General MOS   0.299*** 
   (0.033) 
Constant .219*** 0.221*** 0.245*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Observations 63,003 63,003 63,003 
Adjusted R-square 0.003 0.007 0.014 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
To determine the extent to which enlistees who attend the most populous accession 
period perform at a greater level relative to other accession periods, I generate a comparison 
matrix with the distribution of average PRO/CON scores per grade by accession trimester. 
Figures 11 to 14 illustrate the average PRO/CON scores per grade and Table 12 combines 
this information into a singular matrix for analysis. Table 12 also displays confidence 
intervals for each score and grade in the appropriate trimester. As shown in Table 12, the 
enlistees from the FMAM period slightly outperform the other accession periods in the 
grade of E1 and E2. ONDJ enlistees outperform the other accession periods in the grade of 
E3 and E4. Initial results indicate JJAS enlistees do not perform at a greater level than the 
other trimesters.  
To test whether the outcomes are statistically significant, I conduct a confidence 
interval comparison for each score and grade to confirm if the PRO/CON estimated 
differences are statistically significant. Table 12 illustrates that in the grade of E1, there is 
no statistical significance in values. However, the gap in intervals for the other grades 
indicates the values are statistically significant. Even with the statistical significance, the 
changes in value are relatively close and unlikely to provide managerial significance. 
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Figure 11. E1 PRO/CON Average Score 
 
Figure 12. E2 PRO/CON Average Score 
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Figure 13. E3 PRO/CON Average Score 
 


























































41.996 41.953 - 
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43.178 43.150 - 
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42.888 42.857 - 
42.920




44.304 44.281 - 
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42.034 41.988 - 
42.080
43.165 43.136 - 
43.195
42.952 42.920 - 
42.985
43.623 43.599 - 
43.647
43.532 43.505 - 
43.560
44.309 44.283 - 
44.334





42.033 42.008 - 
42.060
43.030 43.011 - 
43.049
42.856 42.836 - 
42.875
43.566 43.550 - 
43.582
43.494 43.476 - 
43.511
44.214 44.196 - 
44.231
44.187 44.170 - 
44.206
E1 E2 E3 E4
Trimester
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To test if enlistees not categorized as high-quality influenced the result, I conduct 
the same relative performance matrix on high-quality enlistees. A high-quality enlistee is 
an enlistee with a high school diploma and has an AFQT score of 50 or above. As with the 
previous format, I generate a comparison matrix with for high-quality enlistees. Figures 15 
to 18 illustrate the average PRO/CON scores per grade and Table 13 combines that 
information and the confidence intervals into a singular matrix for analysis. As with the 
previous comparison matrix, Table 13 shows the high-quality enlistees from JJAS did not 
perform at a greater level than the other accession trimesters. The confidence interval 
figures mirror the previous results indicating statistical significance at the grades E2 to E4. 
As with the previous comparison matrix, the changes in value are relatively small.  
 
Figure 15. High-Quality Enlistees E1 PRO/CON Average Scores 
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Figure 16. High-Quality Enlistees E2 PRO/CON Average Score 
 
Figure 17. High-Quality Enlistees E3 PRO/CON Average Score 
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Figure 18. High-Quality Enlistees E4 PRO/CON Average Score
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42.072 42.013 - 
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42.061 42.031 - 
42.091
43.102 43.080 - 
43.124
42.927 42.904 - 
42.949
43.638 43.620 - 
43.656
43.563 43.563 - 
43.583
44.284 44.263 - 
44.304
44.258 44.238 - 
44.279
Trimester
E1 E2 E3 E4
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C. TERTIARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
To determine the manner in which an increase in TAT affects attrition, I continue 
to use LPM to conduct analysis and interpret the results. Table 14 provides the output of 
the LPM regression. The binary dependent variable reflects an enlistee that fails to 
complete the first term of enlistment (Attrite=1) or successfully fulfills a first term 
enlistment (Attrite=0). The initial model shows the TAT estimate has a statistical 
significance at the α = 0.001 level. However, the result indicates the more TAT an enlistee 
accumulates the less likely that enlistee will attrite. A possible explanation for this 
relationship is that a greater number of higher quality enlistees are in the trimesters that 
accumulate the most TAT and these enlistees are less likely to attrite. 
The final model continues to show the TAT coefficient as statistically significant 
with a small decrease in the coefficient estimate. Fiscal year 2014, aviation MOS, and 
general MOS estimates are also significant at the α = 0.001 level. Fiscal year 2014 has a 
negative correlation with attrition. As with the retention model, the economic environment 
helps explain the relationship with fiscal year 2014 and attrition as it did with retention. An 
enlistee from the 2014 cohort is 1.1 percentage points less likely to attrite than other cohorts 
in the study.  
For the MOS controls, an enlistee in the aviation MOS groups is more likely to 
attrite than other enlistees in the ground support community. By examining the data set, a 
possible explanation is aviation MOS has a smaller representation and a single attrite from 
the MOS greatly impacts the model, when compared to ground support MOS. As for the 
general MOS group, a closer look at the appendix reveals some of the enlistees are in the 
80XX community. The information suggests these enlistees could not attain a valid MOS. 
Therefore, the result that enlistees in the general MOS, on average, are more likely to attrite 
than those of the ground support MOS mirrors the data set.  
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Table 14. Time Awaiting Training Effects on Attrition 
Variable Initial Fiscal Year PMOS 
FLC Wait Time -0.00099*** -0.00099*** -0.00098*** 
 (0.000044) (0.000044) (0.000045) 
JJAS -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0022 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
FMAM 0.0025 0.0026 0.0034 
 (0.0036) (0.0036 (0.0036) 
FY12  -0.0051 -0.0054 
  (0.0031) (0.0030) 
FY14  -0.011*** -0.013*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Combat MOS   0.0021 
   (0.0030) 
Aviation MOS   0.015*** 
   (0.0038) 
General MOS   0.37*** 
   (0.023) 
Constant .17*** .17*** .17*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0036) 
Observations 72,830 72,830 72,830 
Adjusted R-square 0.0070 0.0071 0.014 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I provide an analysis for each research question. The analysis finds 
that the JJAS phasing approach seems to impact the number of TAT days an enlistee 
acquires. JJAS enlistees average four more days of TAT than FMAM enlistees. Moreover, 
the phasing approach increases the TAT days for the follow-on trimester. The accumulation 
of TAT days appears to reduce an enlistee’s probability of re-enlistment past the first term. 
By comparing performance metrics, the analysis suggests that JJAS enlistees did not 
perform better than their counterparts. Although there is statistical significance in the 
estimates, the changes in value are incremental. The attrition model reveals that TAT seem 
to reduce the probability that an enlistee would attrite in their first term. However, enlistees 
with the highest mean of TAT days are from the JJAS trimester, which has a higher 
concentration of high-quality enlistees. Therefore, it stands to reason there is a negative 
relationship with attrition, as high-quality enlistees are less likely to attrite. These analyses 
are the foundational elements of my conclusion and recommendations in the succeeding 
chapter.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this study I conduct analysis on the structural effects of the accession trimester 
on retention, performance, and attrition. Every enlisted Marine goes through the EELT 
pipeline. Therefore, it is critical to determine if the accession trimester surge creates 
unintended consequences. I use three different techniques to provide analysis and obtain 
interpretable results. Having insight into the structural analysis of the accession trimesters 
gives decision-makers the information needed to implement policy that maximizes 




To determine to what degree does an enlistee’s accession period affects the accrual 
of TAT, I use a multivariate linear regression model. The model indicates the JJAS 
accession trimester significantly affects the accrual TAT. JJAS enlistees accumulate four 
more days of TAT than the average enlistee. The results mirror the other research that has 
been conducted on TAT. Interestingly, ONDJ has the second highest average accumulation 
of TAT days. This relationship indicates the JJAS accession period generates increased 
TAT for two accession periods. The enlistees from these two accession periods nearly 
average 30 days of TAT. Considering the number of enlistees that process through JJAS, 
the total TAT days accumulated by the JJAS accession period considerably surpass the 
other trimesters. The JJAS accession process captures high-quality enlistees but appears to 
also increase the amount of TAT for JJAS and ONDJ enlistees.  
2. Retention 
I fit an LPM to determine the effects that TAT and an accession period have on 
retention. A successful measure of retention is if an enlistee continues to serve past their 
first term of enlistment. I discover that both JJAS and FMAM appear to have a positive 
relationship with re-enlisting and that the estimates are statistically significant. According 
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to the model, JJAS enlistees are 1.7 and FMAM enlistees 1.5 percentage points more likely 
to re-enlist. TAT has a negative relationship with re-enlistment. One day of TAT equates 
to a 0.1 percentage point reduction in the probability of re-enlistment. Given the context, 
17 days or more of TAT nullify the positive effect JJAS has on re-enlistment. 
3. Performance 
I measure and compare the average PRO/CON scores per grade by accession 
trimester and find JJAS enlistees do not perform relatively better than Marines from the 
other accession periods. While confidence intervals indicate that certain comparisons are 
statistically significant, the difference are so small they are of no practical use. 
4. Attrition 
Contrary to previous studies, an enlistee’s accession period, according to my data 
set, has no relationship with the likelihood of attrition. Other studies have included 
demographics and individual characteristics, such as waivers, as an independent variable. 
My study focuses on structural analysis and the difference in approaches can explain the 
differences in the results with other studies. My study does reveal a negative relationship 
between TAT and attrition. Considering enlistees that accumulate more TAT are from the 
accession periods with the highest concentration of high-quality enlistees, the relationship 
is understandable. The high-quality enlistees are less likely to attrite and desire to complete 
training to become operational.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current accession process generates TAT among the JJAS and ONDJ enlistees. 
As the accession mission is to attain high-quality enlistees and the retention mission is to 
retain high-quality Marines, a cost benefit analysis should be conducted to determine if 
smoothing out the accession plan has a greater cost than the current accession plan. As the 
average difference for an enlistee from JJAS and ONDJ is a single day, when considering 
the number of enlistees processed in those trimesters and the average days accumulated by 
each enlistee, approximately 30 days in this data set, the fiscal consequence of not 
conducting further analysis is substantial.  
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My study utilizes only three fiscal years of data. Continued research on structural 
analysis of the accession process and EELT pipeline should be conducted using larger 
samples and include the potential accumulation of TAT from bootcamp graduation to the 
start of MCT/SOI training. The new data should also obtain days an enlistee is on leave or 
participating in PRASP while in the transition periods to increase the accuracy of the 
analysis.  
My regression analysis does not include demographics and solely attempts to 
provide analysis on the structural system of the accession trimesters and the overall EELT 
process. Through my study, there appears to be a statistically significant correlating 
relationship with accession period, TAT, and retention. My study, taken into conjunction 
with other studies, provides critical information that can be used to increase efficiency and 
the overall lethality of the United States Marine Corps. 
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APPENDIX: MOS DISTRIBUTION 
Table 15. MOS Distribution 
MOS Freq. Percent Cum. MOS Group 
0 1 0 0 General 
100 252 0.29 0.29 Ground Support 
111 3,411 3.87 4.16 Ground Support 
151 1 0 4.16 Ground Support 
161 229 0.26 4.42 Ground Support 
200 269 0.31 4.73 Ground Support 
231 994 1.13 5.85 Ground Support 
261 84 0.1 5.95 Ground Support 
300 1,246 1.41 7.36 Combat 
311 10,937 12.42 19.78 Combat 
313 466 0.53 20.31 Combat 
321 229 0.26 20.57 Combat 
331 1,904 2.16 22.73 Combat 
341 1,986 2.25 24.98 Combat 
351 901 1.02 26.01 Combat 
352 832 0.94 26.95 Combat 
400 159 0.18 27.13 Ground Support 
411 512 0.58 27.71 Ground Support 
431 628 0.71 28.43 Ground Support 
451 108 0.12 28.55 Ground Support 
481 689 0.78 29.33 Ground Support 
500 21 0.02 29.35 Ground Support 
511 208 0.24 29.59 Ground Support 
600 507 0.58 30.17 Ground Support 
612 1,061 1.2 31.37 Ground Support 
621 3,199 3.63 35 Ground Support 
623 109 0.12 35.13 Ground Support 
627 191 0.22 35.34 Ground Support 
631 25 0.03 35.37 Ground Support 
651 1,787 2.03 37.4 Ground Support 
671 6 0.01 37.41 Ground Support 
800 241 0.27 37.68 Combat 
811 1,285 1.46 39.14 Combat 
842 168 0.19 39.33 Combat 
844 305 0.35 39.68 Combat 
847 99 0.11 39.79 Combat 
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MOS Freq. Percent Cum. MOS Group 
861 296 0.34 40.12 Combat 
1100 223 0.25 40.38 Ground Support 
1141 458 0.52 40.9 Ground Support 
1142 465 0.53 41.42 Ground Support 
1161 255 0.29 41.71 Ground Support 
1171 464 0.53 42.24 Ground Support 
1300 460 0.52 42.76 Ground Support 
1316 169 0.19 42.95 Ground Support 
1341 751 0.85 43.81 Ground Support 
1345 1,038 1.18 44.99 Ground Support 
1361 54 0.06 45.05 Ground Support 
1371 2,000 2.27 47.32 Ground Support 
1391 679 0.77 48.09 Ground Support 
1800 145 0.16 48.25 Combat 
1812 389 0.44 48.69 Combat 
1833 885 1 49.7 Combat 
2100 288 0.33 50.03 Ground Support 
2111 649 0.74 50.76 Ground Support 
2131 108 0.12 50.88 Ground Support 
2141 231 0.26 51.15 Ground Support 
2146 205 0.23 51.38 Ground Support 
2147 212 0.24 51.62 Ground Support 
2161 82 0.09 51.71 Ground Support 
2171 249 0.28 52 Ground Support 
2300 63 0.07 52.07 Ground Support 
2311 862 0.98 53.05 Ground Support 
2600 581 0.66 53.71 Ground Support 
2621 483 0.55 54.25 Ground Support 
2631 181 0.21 54.46 Ground Support 
2641 34 0.04 54.5 Ground Support 
2651 344 0.39 54.89 Ground Support 
2671 71 0.08 54.97 Ground Support 
2673 55 0.06 55.03 Ground Support 
2674 46 0.05 55.08 Ground Support 
2676 51 0.06 55.14 Ground Support 
2800 1,132 1.29 56.43 Ground Support 
2821 89 0.1 56.53 Ground Support 
2831 106 0.12 56.65 Ground Support 
2841 631 0.72 57.36 Ground Support 
2847 317 0.36 57.72 Ground Support 
2871 63 0.07 57.8 Ground Support 
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MOS Freq. Percent Cum. MOS Group 
2887 28 0.03 57.83 Ground Support 
3000 174 0.2 58.03 Ground Support 
3043 1,639 1.86 59.89 Ground Support 
3051 1,443 1.64 61.52 Ground Support 
3052 121 0.14 61.66 Ground Support 
3100 21 0.02 61.68 Ground Support 
3112 242 0.27 61.96 Ground Support 
3300 121 0.14 62.1 Ground Support 
3381 1,109 1.26 63.36 Ground Support 
3400 71 0.08 63.44 Ground Support 
3432 481 0.55 63.98 Ground Support 
3451 232 0.26 64.25 Ground Support 
3500 893 1.01 65.26 Ground Support 
3521 2,144 2.43 67.69 Ground Support 
3531 4,677 5.31 73 Ground Support 
4300 50 0.06 73.06 Ground Support 
4341 186 0.21 73.27 Ground Support 
4400 54 0.06 73.33 Ground Support 
4421 208 0.24 73.57 Ground Support 
4541 7 0.01 73.58 Ground Support 
4571 3 0 73.58 Ground Support 
4600 65 0.07 73.65 Ground Support 
4612 54 0.06 73.71 Ground Support 
4641 102 0.12 73.83 Ground Support 
4671 74 0.08 73.91 Ground Support 
5500 49 0.06 73.97 Ground Support 
5512 37 0.04 74.01 Ground Support 
5524 237 0.27 74.28 Ground Support 
5700 62 0.07 74.35 Ground Support 
5711 321 0.36 74.72 Ground Support 
5800 340 0.39 75.1 Ground Support 
5811 1,687 1.92 77.02 Ground Support 
5831 340 0.39 77.4 Ground Support 
5900 426 0.48 77.89 Ground Support 
5939 64 0.07 77.96 Ground Support 
5942 10 0.01 77.97 Ground Support 
5948 40 0.05 78.02 Ground Support 
5951 5 0.01 78.02 Ground Support 
5952 40 0.05 78.07 Ground Support 
5953 75 0.09 78.15 Ground Support 
5954 41 0.05 78.2 Ground Support 
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MOS Freq. Percent Cum. MOS Group 
5974 53 0.06 78.26 Ground Support 
5979 26 0.03 78.29 Ground Support 
6000 590 0.67 78.96 Aviation 
6042 168 0.19 79.15 Aviation 
6046 561 0.64 79.78 Aviation 
6048 398 0.45 80.24 Aviation 
6062 173 0.2 80.43 Aviation 
6072 215 0.24 80.68 Aviation 
6073 247 0.28 80.96 Aviation 
6074 106 0.12 81.08 Aviation 
6092 265 0.3 81.38 Aviation 
6111 462 0.52 81.9 Aviation 
6112 19 0.02 81.92 Aviation 
6113 419 0.48 82.4 Aviation 
6114 455 0.52 82.92 Aviation 
6116 261 0.3 83.21 Aviation 
6122 10 0.01 83.22 Aviation 
6123 97 0.11 83.33 Aviation 
6124 80 0.09 83.43 Aviation 
6132 103 0.12 83.54 Aviation 
6152 18 0.02 83.56 Aviation 
6153 353 0.4 83.96 Aviation 
6154 333 0.38 84.34 Aviation 
6156 301 0.34 84.68 Aviation 
6173 67 0.08 84.76 Aviation 
6174 73 0.08 84.84 Aviation 
6176 75 0.09 84.93 Aviation 
6200 271 0.31 85.23 Aviation 
6212 210 0.24 85.47 Aviation 
6213 39 0.04 85.52 Aviation 
6216 125 0.14 85.66 Aviation 
6217 244 0.28 85.94 Aviation 
6218 69 0.08 86.01 Aviation 
6222 50 0.06 86.07 Aviation 
6223 27 0.03 86.1 Aviation 
6227 101 0.11 86.22 Aviation 
6251 288 0.33 86.54 Aviation 
6252 167 0.19 86.73 Aviation 
6253 47 0.05 86.79 Aviation 
6256 87 0.1 86.89 Aviation 
6257 235 0.27 87.15 Aviation 
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MOS Freq. Percent Cum. MOS Group 
6258 35 0.04 87.19 Aviation 
6276 38 0.04 87.24 Aviation 
6281 19 0.02 87.26 Aviation 
6282 76 0.09 87.34 Aviation 
6283 31 0.04 87.38 Aviation 
6286 80 0.09 87.47 Aviation 
6287 72 0.08 87.55 Aviation 
6288 14 0.02 87.57 Aviation 
6300 1,400 1.59 89.16 Aviation 
6312 8 0.01 89.16 Aviation 
6313 32 0.04 89.2 Aviation 
6314 176 0.2 89.4 Aviation 
6316 51 0.06 89.46 Aviation 
6317 177 0.2 89.66 Aviation 
6322 6 0.01 89.67 Aviation 
6323 166 0.19 89.86 Aviation 
6324 170 0.19 90.05 Aviation 
6326 125 0.14 90.19 Aviation 
6332 67 0.08 90.27 Aviation 
6333 36 0.04 90.31 Aviation 
6336 54 0.06 90.37 Aviation 
6337 148 0.17 90.54 Aviation 
6338 63 0.07 90.61 Aviation 
6386 41 0.05 90.65 Aviation 
6400 757 0.86 91.51 Aviation 
6414 13 0.01 91.53 Aviation 
6423 94 0.11 91.63 Aviation 
6432 163 0.19 91.82 Aviation 
6433 6 0.01 91.83 Aviation 
6469 255 0.29 92.12 Aviation 
6483 121 0.14 92.25 Aviation 
6492 109 0.12 92.38 Aviation 
6499 137 0.16 92.53 Aviation 
6500 309 0.35 92.88 Aviation 
6531 652 0.74 93.62 Aviation 
6541 551 0.63 94.25 Aviation 
6600 171 0.19 94.44 Aviation 
6672 725 0.82 95.27 Aviation 
6694 110 0.12 95.39 Aviation 
6800 100 0.11 95.5 Aviation 
6842 85 0.1 95.6 Aviation 
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MOS Freq. Percent Cum. MOS Group 
7000 178 0.2 95.8 Aviation 
7011 212 0.24 96.04 Aviation 
7041 390 0.44 96.49 Aviation 
7051 621 0.7 97.19 Aviation 
7200 230 0.26 97.45 Aviation 
7212 232 0.26 97.72 Aviation 
7234 29 0.03 97.75 Aviation 
7236 131 0.15 97.9 Aviation 
7242 168 0.19 98.09 Aviation 
7251 185 0.21 98.3 Aviation 
7257 114 0.13 98.43 Aviation 
7300 47 0.05 98.48 Aviation 
7314 70 0.08 98.56 Aviation 
7315 1 0 98.56 Aviation 
8000 182 0.21 98.77 General 
8011 695 0.79 99.56 General 
8900 81 0.09 99.65 General 
8972 308 0.35 100 General 
9900 1 0 100 General      
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